When studying the conflict unfolding in Ukraine, two axes of confrontation are most often considered: Russia versus Ukraine and Russia versus the West. The author is convinced that such division is a false dyad. Ukraine is a kind of battering ram, which has been prepared with regard to the specific class organization, as well as militarily. Through Ukraine, the West is trying to solve its main foreign policy objective, i.e. to eliminate Russia as an adversary and then, before the momentum is lost, to challenge China as well. Nevertheless, the West is weakening and is in a phase where it is starting to lose its global position. Thus, for the West, which is coming to realize that it is on the verge of a political and economic crisis, the war in Ukraine is the last chance to deal with two key issues: to finish off its main adversaries by military and political means and at the same time, indirectly, to avoid a possible war.

The post-Soviet space is once again in turbulence. It is difficult today to predict how such reorganization will play out and what consequences it will have for Russia, its neighbouring states and forthe international order as a whole. Nevertheless, we are already witnessing the most extensive changes in the former Soviet Union since the collapse of what was once a single state. It is necessary, however, to separate the legal process ofthe collapse ofthe USSR from the historical dimension of the phenomenon. In legal terms, the USSR does not exist, and in historical terms, the end of the single state could not automatically ensure the viability and legitimacy of the new independent entities that emerged from its ruins. At the present stage, it is indisputable that the Belovezha Accords failed to provide a real guarantee against a repetition, to one degree or another, of the Yugoslav scenario.

This article examines scenarios for the development of relations between certain members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia. The author attempts to assess the bloc’s internal cohesion in terms of relations with Russia and to identify what timelines key NATO member states have defined as to their foreign policy planning in the current crisis.

Theconflict in Ukraine unfolds at least at three levels– local, international and global. At the same time, the conflict dynamics at all three levels are interconnected, while the interests of external stakeholders directly influence the behavior of local players and determine the prospects for the outcome of the conflict. This article presents Russian assessments of the logic of American policy on the European and Ukrainian tracks in the context of the US attempts to retain the initiative and preserve dominance in international affairs.

Moscow does not deny the significance of the security interests of small states, but it is important to recognize the security interests of all actors in the system, including the larger ones. The history of the Cold War clearly shows that a stable system of confrontation management and conflict resolution is possible. Russia’s proposals for an inclusive security system in Europe have been ignored multiple times. One reason explaining the reluctance to take Russian proposals into consideration is that, geopolitically, time is structured differently for Russia and for the West. The understanding of the West is linked to national electoral cycles. Whereas for Russia, geopolitical time is measured by epochs that are outlined starting with major historical events: wars, peace treaties and political cataclysms. The conflict in Ukraine turned out to be a point where these contradictions came to concentrate.

Every conflict sooner or later ends in peace. This is the conventional wisdom that can often be heard from those who, in the current “tsunami” of sanctions and confrontation with the West, try to find hope for a return to “normality”. For the most part, sanctions against Russia will not be lifted even if there is a ceasefire in Ukraine and the conflict is resolved. There will be no return to “pre-February normality”. Instead of remembering the lost past, the focus will have to be on creating a new future in which sanctions imposed by the West will remain a constant variable.

Interview with Nikolay Y. Silaev, PhD (History), Director of the Laboratory for Intellectual Data Analysis, Institute for International Studies, MGIMO University, Moscow (Russia).

The Minsk agreements were conceived as an opportunity for peace in Ukraine, but their failure only exacerbated the dynamics of the conflict. How did the negotiations between the parties of the conflict go? Why did diplomacy fail and is there a possibility of its revival? The interview with an expert of the political working group within the Minsk negotiations seeks answers to these questions.