Brazil has historically been regarded as the natural leader of Latin America, given its level of development, the size of its economy, its military might and its ambitious foreign policy. This image was cemented during the presidencies of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, who supported Latin American integration (particularly via the creation of such blocs as UNASUR and CELAC) and diminishing Washington’s historical influence in the Western Hemisphere. However, the situation has dramatically changed with the rise to power of President Jair Bolsonaro, a staunch supporter of the US in general (and President Donald Trump in particular), which has affected Brazil’s role in the region. Based upon the analysis of specific domestic and foreign policy components, the author draws conclusions on how Brazil’s prospects as a participant (or even the key motivator) in the transformation processes in the region have changed. Brazil is no longer perceived as the axis of attempts at regional integration, but rather “just another separate state” taking care of its own interests. Brazil’s economic crisis and Bolsonaro’s strategy (or the lack thereof) regarding the COVID-19 pandemic have negatively affected Brazil’s image even further. Then again, as this analysis seeks to demonstrate, Latin America has a mixed record when it comes to integration attempts, as regional governments are zealous guardians of national sovereignty. Hence, while there have been some successful regional thrivings towards promoting cooperation, the rise of some supranationalist organization similar to the European Union – is a dream. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as Latin American (and Caribbean) blocs do not need supranationalism to be effective, but it shows the limits of regional integration initiatives.

In the last two decades, China became a major economic force in Latin America, due to trade and investment, and it established strong links with the countries in the region, including a strategic partnership with Brazil. However, Chinese influence is also provoking concerns in the United States, while the latter is trying to curb Beijing’s role in Latin America. This paper analyzes China’s actions in the region and the American response, using Brazil as a case-study environment because of its importance for the Chinese foreign policy and its current president, who adopted a pro-Trump foreign policy and a rhetoric that is very critical of Beijing. The author begins by analyzing China’s strategy towards Latin America presenting a historical outlook of major events thereto, particularly underscoring both growth and diversification of the Chinese investments in the last decade. The author then proceeds to analyzing current position of the U.S. towards Chinese actions in Latin America, additionally highlighting major U.S. concerns thereto. The final part of the paper represents a case-study of Chinese policy towards Brazil and correspondent Brasília’s position on the subject concerned. It is noted that close-term prospects are complicated to draw due to the dynamic changes in the international scenario, with the deterioration of the Washington-Beijing relations, and the cross-pressures that these disputes will bring to Brazil.

The author of the article under consideration analyzes Brazilian foreign policy in the period of the two years of Jair Bolsonaro’s government. According to predictions, introduction of the ultraright politician to power radically changed Brazil’s traditional foreign policy recognized for its independence, pragmatism and moderation. ‘Bolsonarist’ diplomacy led by chancellor Ernesto Araújo, following the agenda of the foreign policy of the United States, deconstructs the paradigms of Brazilian diplomacy, including the so-called ‘responsible pragmatism’ formulated by the government of president Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) during the military dictatorship as one of the pillars of Brazil’s role on the world stage, including the 13 years of the center-left government of the Worker’s Party (2003- 2016). Thus, paradoxically, Jair Bolsonaro ignores the lessons of the military regime of which he is an admirer and an apologist. Despite that, however, Bolsonaro’s government has reaffirmed Brazil’s role in BRICS, responded to threats posed to Brazil’s sovereignty over the Brazilian Amazon and reaffirmed its decision not to join the IAEA Additional Protocol. Stripped of its alliance with ‘trumpism’, Brazil will face challenges in environmental and human rights areas with Joe Biden’s administration. Possible dismissal of Ernesto Araújo, being an object of discontent in agribusiness and in the military, political and diplomatic circles, may mean an ‘adjustment’, but it will not bring about significant changes in the foreign policy of ‘bolsonarism’.

Jair Bolsonaro’s leadership in Brazil fits into the general modern trend towards a more conservative outlook in various parts of the world. This article attempts to explore the reasons for this shift and to discover the keys to understanding it. The article focuses on the dynamics of political processes in Brazil leading up to Jair Bolsonaro’s rise to power and unfolding in the country today. The central question to which the authors seek answer is: what actors and trends are behind this “turn to the right”? Political attitudes are largely driven by discourses of national identity and self-determination, which are reflected in the very nature of any human. The authors identify the anchoring categories of such identities (faith, labor, family) and trace, in historical perspective, the development of political actors and social groups that shape this breakdown into identity groups and predetermine the political dialogue in the state. The article notes the significant influence of the religious component, with it being reflected even in the presence of Evangelicals among top officials. The armed forces continue to provide political support and maintain their stability as guarantors of order. The decentralization of information through social media has intensified the public outreach, with a more heated debate or even a certain polarization of public opinion, although not necessarily having any effect on domestic or foreign policy decisions. The socio-economic axes on which national decisions are aligned are associated with a feeling of renewal, but in fact many factors point to a lasting conservative orientation.

In the article under consideration, the author examines three main waves of the Russian-speaking immigration to Brazil and, particularly, to the State of São Paulo and its capital of the same name, during the first half of the 20th century. The first wave refers to the period from 1921 to the late 1930s. We consider the arrival of general Wrangel’s soldiers and officers, in 1921; the resettlement of Russian-speaking farmers from Romanian Bessarabia in 1923-1930s; and the ‘secondary’ migration of Nansen refugees from Europe during the 1930s. The second wave represents the post-war subsidized migration of Russian displaced persons (DPs), and the third one is the resettlement of the Russians from China during the 1950s. The author relies on a vast number of authentic sources from public and private archives, such as Russian-language periodicals in Brazil, Brazilian regulatory acts, and interviews with the descendants of Russian emigrants. Delivering a comparative analysis of the aforementioned waves the author concludes that the patterns of the Russian speakers’ adaptation in Brazil need to be considered in the light of political and economic conditions in the country in a particular period of immigrants’ arrival. It is also noted that anti-Soviet sentiments in Brazilian politics, starting from the mid-1930s, had a negative impact on preservation of the Russian language and Russian culture in the country.

This article provides an overview of the Portuguese economy in the last quarter of the 20th and early 21st centuries. Assessing several key indicators of economic development within a historical perspective, the author highlights the most important factors that set the dynamics of national socio-economic growth. For more than four decades, since the “Carnation Revolution” (April 25, 1974), the Portuguese Republic has undergone profound changes in the economy and the socio-political sphere. In the country, there are new, as well as modernized traditional industries, a modern structure of production and consumption; GDP has increased six times, exports of goods and services have grown dramatically. In general, Portugal organically blended in the world economic system, took its rightful place in the global division of labor. One should take into account the effects of the global crisis of 2008-2009, when the Portuguese economy found itself in the epicenter of the “perfect storm” (pairing internal and external negative factors) and was pushed back in practically all key macroeconomic indicators. Despite such a system failure, in the second half of the 2010s, Portugal managed to cope with the peak of the crisis, overcame the general effects of the recession and began to show some of the highest rates of economic growth among the states of the euro zone. However, preservation of the positive economic dynamics is currently threatened by external challenges that require timely and effective response. Such challenges of global nature include the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic impact of which appeared to be a real shock for Portugal, as well as for many other countries in the world.

In 2015, Portugal entered a new political cycle with the main actors being the left-wing parties under the auspices of the Socialist Party and its leader Antonio Costa who took over as prime minister. The author analyzes the results of the socialist government activities carried out with the parliamentary support of the left. The author also studies the electoral process of 2017-2019, the dynamics of strengthening the position of the Socialist Party, and significance of the results of elections to national authorities. The trajectory of the country’s membership in the European Union, the history of the results of the European Parliament elections, including the 2019 elections, and the positions of the main political parties are analyzed. In connection with force majeure circumstances arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, the situation in the healthcare system was also studied and a program of the authorities to prevent the spread of coronavirus infection is presented in the article. The author touches upon the economic consequences of the pandemic, especially on those industries that will be most affected – tourism in particular. The article contains a brief forecast of the alignment of political forces on the eve of the presidential elections in 2021. The key is the idea that the pandemic will make possible adjustments in terms of the image and ratings of the country’s leaders and other participants in the election race. While presidential election results are usually a foregone conclusion in the event that a current head of state runs for a second term (as it is shown in the brief historical overview leading up to the article), the prime minister’s growing leadership can make adjustments to the final outcomes.